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Divine foreknowledge and providence  
in the commentaries of Boethius and Aquinas  
on the De interpretatione 9 by Aristotle
Abstract. Boethius represents one of the most important milestones in Christian re-
flection about fate and providence, especially considering that he takes into account 
Proclus’ contributions to these questions. For this reason, The Consolation of philosophy 
is considered a crucial work for the development of this topic. However, Boethius also 
exposes his ideas in his commentary on the book that constitutes one of the oldest and 
most relevant texts on the problem of future contingents, namely Aristotle’s De inter-
pretatione. Although St. Thomas refers to Boethius many times in his systematic works 
and even devotes two commentaries to two of his theological opuscules, it is of special 
interest that both authors composed a commentary on the abovementioned work by 
Aristotle. The commentary of Saint Thomas does not interpret the whole book, but 
it does study the pages about future contingents in dialogue with Boethius. We will 
study such texts in our presentation. They constitute one of the greatest contributions 
of Aquinas to the problem of necessity and contingency and therefore to the vexata 
quaestio of divine intervention in the world and particularly in human free will. Not 
only Augustin but also Aristotle (read by Boethius) and Nemesius of Emesa will be 
decisive in Aquinas’ perception of this matter.
Keywords: providence; determinism; free will; divine foreknowledge; Aristotle’s com-
mentaries.
Introduction
Boethius (480–524/5) is a figure of great importance in the history of Chris-tian reflection on divine providence and its relation to free will. His con-
tributions to this topic in  his Consolation of Philosophy are particularly well 
known. Aquinas will take advantage of this treatise especially to understand 
the question of divine knowledge of future contingents. However, Boethius 
had worked on this subject in a previous writing, his commentary on the trea-
tise De interpretatione by Aristotle, in the famous passage where he wonders 
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if there will be or will not be a naval battle tomorrow (18b18–19b4). Boethius’ 
commentary is particularly interesting when he speaks about the question of 
divine prescience and providence because he is one of the Christian authors 
who integrates Neoplatonic reflections in this regard, particularly the treatis-
es of Proclus, which unfortunately Moerbeke translated only after the death 
of St. Thomas.
It is probable that Aquinas knew the comment to De interpretatione since 
the beginning of his career, but it  is certain that he revisited it  in his matu-
rity when he composed his own commentary on that book of Aristotle around 
1270/1.1 In  my contribution, first I intend to review the main teachings of 
Boethius; later, I will show how Aquinas uses them when he composes his own 
commentary and builds his personal view of the issues of providence, freedom 
and future contingents.
In his commentary on the book Aquinas follows, in addition to Boethius’, 
the commentary of Ammonius.2 It is remarkable that Ammonius’ commentary 
was translated by Moerbeke only a few years before (1268). The comparison of 
the Greek commentator with the great Latin commentator was very useful to 
our author.
As mentioned above I will focus on the ninth chapter of Aristotle’s book. 
The passage about the naval battle roused reflection on divine foreknowledge 
due to the question about the truth-value of future contingents. Boethius must 
address other philosophy’s schools, particularly the Stoics, and therefore he de-
velops a kind of quaestio on divine prescience. Aquinas also contributes to this 
topic with a sort of parenthesis in his commentary.
1. Boethius on De interpretatione
Let us begin by presenting the main contributions of Boethius to the subject of 
providence and human free will in his commentary on De interpretatione. It is 
a work preceding the Consolation of philosophy, where some years later several 
problems will be better explained. However, the most important arguments of 
Boethius’ solution to the question of divine foreknowledge are already exposed.
In De interpretatione, Aristotle asks about the truth-value of future contin-
gents. The question is: will there be a naval battle tomorrow or not? Only one 
of both possibilities will happen. Does that mean that the “truth” of the future 
1 Between December 1270 and the middle of October 1271: for dating, see J.-P. Torrell, 
Initiation à saint Thomas d’Aquin, pp. 328.500.
2 Ibidem, p. 329.
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event is already fixed? In  fact, if one person affirms and another one denies 
that there will be a battle, after the event, it will be discovered that one told 
“the truth” and the other one said something “false”. Consequently, from the 
beginning, was one of the statements true and the other false?3 The affirmative 
answer to this question was given by the Stoics. For them, the future is true be-
cause it is necessarily defined by a combination of unavoidable causes. It is the 
thesis of causal determinism combated by Christian authors and condemned 
again by Tempier.
One can also answer that question negatively, saying that one cannot speak 
of truth and falsehood in future contingents, as in ancient times the Epicureans 
suggested and Łukasiewicz proposed in  his own way in  our times. Another 
answer would be to say that one can speak of truth and falsehood of future 
propositions, even if the events are not determined by fixed causal laws, but are 
contingent and indeterminate. This is the position of Carneades. He said that 
the propositions about future contingents would be, however, as certain before 
happening as they will be afterwards. This is somewhat paradoxical: is the same 
kind of truth really given in  the things that are happening and in those that 
happened or also in those that are not yet decided?
Boethius proposes a fourth alternative to this problem. His originality lies 
in it. Against causal determinism, he believes that future events are contingent 
because of the way they are produced, so that not all events are necessary but 
some are contingent. Furthermore, opposing Carneades, he does not believe 
that the truth-value of future contingents can be considered identical to that 
of past and present events. Thus, Boethius’ solution is that claims about future 
contingents can be evaluated as true or false, but their truth or falsity could be 
not “determined”. This is the same proposal presented by Ammonius but this 
does not necessarily mean that Boethius depends on him, since both could 
inherit a common tradition.
To understand Boethius’ position, the distinction sustained by Aristotle 
himself in De interpretatione should also be considered: he states that one can 
only say that an intrinsically contingent event (such as a naval battle) “is” neces-
sary, under the assumption that it is in fact happening. In that sense and only 
in that sense it could be said that “everything that is, is necessary” (19a23–24). 
Even things that happen contingently can be designated as “necessary” at least 
under the condition that they are happening. This is called a “hypothetical 
necessity.” Now, this necessity is not an “absolute necessity,” which depends 
on necessary causes that origin the event and make the opposite impossible. 
In this way, the “coming out of the sun” is (absolutely) necessary because it re-
3 From this point, I follow R. Sharples, Fate, prescience and free will.
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lies on the unavoidable cosmic laws, but a “naval battle” would only be contin-
gent because it can happen or not. Now, when the battle is happening, under 
the hypothesis that it is happening, the naval battle becomes, in this sense, (hy-
pothetically) “necessary.”
When Ammonius and Boethius claim that the truth of future things is “in-
determinate” or “changeable,” the meaning of such statement becomes more 
obscure if one forgets the context in which such these is defended, i.e. the rela-
tionship of future events with divine foreknowledge.4 The aim of this position 
is to introduce a new nuance in the history of thought about providence and 
created free will that probably had not been explored before Neoplatonism, 
although perhaps the Stoics tried to point in that direction. Neoplatonists at-
tempt to save both the contingency of sublunary things and the perfect certain-
ty of divine foreknowledge. Now, at first glance, if God knows contingent things 
in a certain and determined way, that seems to mean that He does not know 
things as they are: future things are not determined and, therefore, by knowing 
them in a certain and determined way, they are not known as they are. In other 
words, knowing in a determined way what is intrinsically undetermined would 
seem the same as not knowing it. This difficulty is expressly raised by Boethius 
in his commentary:
Therefore, whoever says that God knows all things and that, for that reason, all 
things are necessarily going to be, says that God believes regarding whatever things 
do not come about necessarily that they are going to come about necessarily. For, 
if God knows that all things are going to come about necessarily, he is mistaken 
in  that knowledge of his, since not all things come about necessarily, but some 
contingently. Therefore, if he knows regarding the things that are going to come 
about that they are going to come about necessarily, he is deceived as regards his 
own providence.5
To avoid this difficulty, Neoplatonists usually hold what has been called the 
“Iamblichus Principle.” According to this principle, things do not have to be 
4 Pace Kretzmann, who thinks that God, providence or fate “have no part to play” 
in Boethius’ theory of contingency (N. Kretzmann, ‘Nos ipsi principia sumus.’ Boethius and 
the basis of contingency, p. 47, note 53).
5 “quisquis ergo dicit deum cuncta nosse et ob hoc cuncta ex necessitate esse futura, 
is dicit deum ex necessitate eventura credere, quaecumque ex necessitate non eveniunt. 
nam si omnia ex necessitate eventura novit deus, in notione sua fallitur. non enim omnia 
ex necessitate eveniunt, sed aliqua contingenter. ergo si quae contingenter eventura sunt 
ex necessitate eventura noverit, in propria providentia falsus est” (Boethius, ed. Meiser, p. 
226, ll. 1–9; trans. Kretzmann, p. 171). This objection was already presented by Alexander 
of Aphrodisias, De fato, CAG 201, 13–21.
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known as they are in themselves, because knowledge is not just of the same na-
ture as things, it is something better than them. In fact, many things are materi-
al and, nevertheless, they are always known in an immaterial way (since knowl-
edge is always immaterial); things are multiple and they are known in unity 
(not only in universals concepts, because also the sight, for instance, can see 
many colors at the same time). Likewise, things can happen contingently or 
freely but the knowledge of them has not to be contingent; it could be precise 
and, in  this sense, “necessary.” In  this way, God can know contingent things 
as He is, not as they are. Now, God would not be deceived in His knowledge, 
because He knows whether things are contingent or not. In a necessary way, He 
knows that the things are contingent. The necessity relies on the nature of His 
knowledge, not on its content, which grasps things as they are, i.e. contingent. 
Although things are not yet determined, divine knowledge, insofar a perfect 
one, is precise, determined and therefore true. This principle of Iamblichus will 
be plainly used in the Consolation but already it was present in the commentary 
on De interpretatione, where Boethius clearly says that God knows things as 
they are, that is, proceeding from contingent or free causes in such a way that 
they could have come about otherwise:
God knows future things not as coming about necessarily but as [coming about] 
contingently, in such a way that he does not fail to know that something else can 
happen too. Nevertheless, he has complete knowledge of what happens by his no-
tion (ratio) of human beings themselves and their actions.6
This text seems to suppose that God knows in  a precise way the things 
whose truth, in Boethius’ terms, is still “indeterminate.” In any case, it would 
be strange that a Latin Christian author who writes after Saint Augustine could 
think otherwise. According to Sharples it is evident, by the last sentence, that 
Boethius is inclined to admit that God possesses an accurate knowledge of the 
reality of things, although he has not yet fully developed his personal point 
6 “novit enim futura deus non ut ex necessitate evenientia sed ut contingenter, ita ut 
etiam aliud posse fieri non ignoret, quid tamen fiat ex ipsorum hominum et actuum ratione 
persciscat” (Boethius, ibidem). I modify the last part of the translation to be more faithful 
to the original: as we will soon see, God does not know human beings “by reason of hu-
man beings themselves” (as Kretzmann writes), but by His own ratio which is the cause of 
the creation of them. So, we do not have to see any contradiction between this treatment 
of the problem and the one of the Consolation, V, 6: pace N. Kretzmann, in: Ammonius, 
On Aristotle’s On Interpretation 9; Boethius, On Aristotle’s On Interpretation 9, p. 190, note 
50. In a similar way, also R. Sharples (Fate, prescience and free will, p. 213) translates: “[…] 
what comes about he knows on the basis of the human beings themselves and their actions.”
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of view, that will be exposed in the Consolation.7 Although this affirmation is 
true, I think that we can already recognize in this text the core of the “Iambli-
chus Principle,” because there is a metaphysical reason to accept it. To find such 
a reason, one should acknowledge that Boethius is not saying that God knows 
things through “things themselves,” as Kretzmann and Sharples translate. That 
would signify that He knows them by “depending” in a way on the things them-
selves: in this case, the statement would be inconsistent with Boethius’ position 
in the Consolation. However, Boethius probably says here that God knows free 
events because of the “notion” (ratio) that He has about them; in other words, 
His knowledge “depends” only on the eternal divine ideas through which God 
knows everything. This ratio is somewhat similar to the expression used in the 
Consolation: “praesentaria notio” (Consol., V, pr. 6, CCSL 94, p. 106, 142), 
a “presential notion.” It refers not to the “present” that creatures had, have or 
will have, but rather to the eternal presence of divine knowledge, the presence 
of such notion in God himself. 
In addition to this, in the same page of the commentary on De interpreta-
tione, Boethius indicates that it is necessary to admit the contingency of things 
not only to respect their own nature but also to preserve the divine benevo-
lence itself, which benefits us by his will. But if God acts by will, He cannot act 
in a necessarily way.8 In this sense, Boethius is advancing the thesis that Scotus 
will make famous but that was already present in Aquinas: only if God is free 
there can be freedom in the cosmos. Soon we will talk about this.
2. Saint Thomas on De interpretatione
When Saint Thomas wrote his commentary on Aristotle’s De interpretatione, 
the first condemnations of the Bishop of Paris, Tempier, had just been promul-
gated. Some of them deal with divine prescience and the relationship between 
omnipotence and freedom created. They are as follows:
3. That a human being’s will necessarily wills or chooses.
4.  That all things here below come under the necessary control of the heavenly 
bodies. […]
7 See ibidem, p. 214.
8 It is interesting to compare Boethius with Ammonius’ Commentary, CAG 134, 12–18, 
who expressly denies that the gods act by their proairesis and boulesis, so that they would act 
only by their own being. That is in full harmony with Neoplatonism but far from a Christian 
conception of God.
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10. That God does not know singulars.
11. That God does not know things other than Himself.
12. That human acts are not ruled by the providence of God.9
These condemnations are so significant and so linked with the problems 
addressed by Aquinas in  this work that they constitute one of the criteria to 
date this commentary, as adopted by Gauthier and followed by Torrell. Also, 
at that time, Aquinas was composing or had composed other booklets on 
the same subject,10 in addition to the question 6 De malo and the quaestions 
9–13 of the Prima secundae that are also related to these topics.11
In the first two condemnations of Tempier cited above (3–4), we can ob-
serve the typical theses of astrological determinism that had been combatted by 
the Church Fathers; however, they did not cease to arouse interest even during 
the Middle Age. Secondly, the following condemnations (10–12) seem to point 
more to the danger that Alexander of Aphrodisia’s reading of Aristotle, followed 
by Averroes, supposed for Christian teachings. An interpretation of these prob-
lems according to the faith had already been made by different Christian au-
thors, among them Boethius, who also tried to find a middle ground between 
Stoic determinism and the merely general providence defended by Platonists 
and Peripatetics. The connection of such attempt with the concerns of Aquinas 
and the problems of his time is evident.12 It is therefore somewhat surprising 
that McInerny neglected the question of providence and divine foreknowledge 
in his study Boethius and Aquinas.13
9 For the translation, see R. McInerny, Aquinas Against the Averroists, On There Being 
Only One Intellect, p. 9. Latin text: “3. Quod voluntas hominis ex necessitate vult vel eligit. 
| 4. Quod omnia, que hic in inferioribus aguntur, subsunt necessitate corporum celestium. 
[…] 10. Quod Deus non cognoscit singularia. | 11. Quod Deus non cognoscit alia a se. | 12. 
Quod humani actus non reguntur providentia Dei” (H. Denifle, Chartularium Universitatis 
Parisiensis, vol. 1, p. 487).
10 De sortibus: 1270–1271, see J.-P. Torrell, Initiation à saint Thomas d’Aquin, p. 315; De 
30, 36 et 43 articulis: 1271, see ibidem, pp. 244–246 and probably De iudiciis astrorum: see 
ibidem, p. 314, note 59.
11 Ibidem p. 328.
12 In Aquinas’ approach to this question, we can appreciate how his metaphysical en-
gagement helps him to present a faithfully interpretation of Christian doctrine, as some 
contemporary defenders of Biblical Thomism highlight: see P. Roszak, Exégesis y metafísica. 
En torno a la hermenéutica bíblica de santo Tomás de Aquino; idem, Language, Metaphysics 
and the Bible. The Philosophical Background of Aquinas’s exegesis of Sacred Scripture.
13 See R. McInerny, Boethius & Aquinas.
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2.1. Boethius in Aquinas’ commentary
In his commentary, when Aquinas reaches the question formulated by Aristotle 
about whether things will necessarily happen, he pauses to remember Boethi-
us’ broad explanation of the different positions on necessity and contingen-
cy.14 There are some interesting reflections in his words. For example, against 
the Stoics and the Megarics, he believes that the necessity and contingency of 
things must be judged “by virtue of the nature of the things.”15 Thus, things 
that have the possibility of being otherwise are contingent in themselves. Now, 
although in other passages of his work he affirmed that the root of contingency 
resides in matter, which is itself open to opposites (S.Th., I, q. 86, a. 3, co.), here 
he affirms that matter alone is not enough to speak of contingency, since the 
heavens possess matter and nevertheless everything that happens in  them is 
necessary.16 For this reason, Aquinas adds that to preserve contingency active 
powers must also be taken into account and they must also be open to oppo-
sites, not determined to only one.
Then, as in the question of the Summa on “fate” (S.Th., I, q. 116, a. 1), Aqui-
nas explains that there are events that happen without a proper cause: we say 
that they happen “by chance.” They are such because there is no cause per se for 
them, they are only produced per accidens. He explains this idea by the example 
of a man who, upon leaving home to have a drink, he is assassinated by some 
assailants.17 The combination of these events as such does not have a true cause: 
the death of the man is added per accidens to a causation that pursues another 
different purpose. In  this sense, this effect is achieved “praeter intentionem”, 
i.e. against the objective pursued by the agent. The Stoic notion of “fate” is pre-
cisely an attempt to suppose that all these events, which do not seem to have 
a true cause, actually do, thanks to the connection of the causes. Here again 
appears the astrological necessity that Aquinas intends to refute, following the 
example of the tradition and Tempier.
14 See Expositio peryermeneias, I, lect. 14, Ed. Leon., p. 73, 160ss.
15 “[…] secundum naturam rerum, ut scilicet illud dicatur necessarium quod in  sua 
natura determinatum est solum ad esse, inpossibile autem quod est determinatum solum ad 
non esse, possibile autem quod ad neutrum est omnino determinatum” (ibidem, 183–187; 
I emphasize the text translated in the body).
16 See ibidem, p. 74, 202–209.
17 Ibidem, p. 75, 245–250. Such occurrence is analogous to Aristotle’s example of a man 
who, while going to the agora for other purposes, by chance finds a debtor ready to give his 
money back (Phys., II, 196b33–197a17); nevertheless, it  is mixed with other example by 
Aristotle about thirst (Metaph., E, 1027b1–6).
Divine foreknowledge and providence in the commentaries of Boethius 159
As Aquinas explains, the intellect and the will do not possess a corporeal 
organ, therefore they cannot be subjected to the physical influence of the stars. 
Surely, the human being can be affected by them under other aspects, such as 
the sensitive powers, but these faculties of the soul are not capable of necessitat-
ing reason or the will.
Moreover, like in  the mentioned question of the Summa, Aquinas sees 
a multiplicity in the casual events that presumably depend on fate. If something 
happens that joins per accidens the attempt of the main cause, a multiplicity is 
produced: now, this complex effect can only be apprehended by intelligence. 
Indeed, natural causes can only produce a single end.18 Only intelligence is able 
to intend a complex outcome. Hence, many philosophers concluded that there 
must be a divine intelligence to guide the effects of fate.19 However, some of 
them, while admitting the existence of a certain divine providence, denied par-
ticular providence. At that moment, omitting his characteristic circumspection 
and in accordance with the recent condemnations of Tempier, Aquinas allows 
himself to call those who denied that God possessed knowledge of the singulars 
and intended to benefit individuals “fools.” Their foolishness consisted in judg-
ing God’s intellect by the same rules that operate in ours, which ignore singu-
lars. Easily one can see here a reference to Averroes.
At this point, Aquinas recalls that in God, intellect is identified with being, 
and His knowledge has the same extension of that infinite being. Since divine 
being embraces all things insofar as they all participate in it, so it can know any 
being. In the same way, divine will extends to any of the existing entities that, 
insofar they are good, are able to be wanted by the will. Aquinas interrupts here 
this metaphysical vision of providence to recall a well-known objection against 
particular providence: if God is the cause of all things, then everything happens 
necessarily since divine science cannot fail and divine will is always infallible.
The response of Aquinas represents his main solution to the problem we 
are examining. According to him, just as Averroes was wrong when he thought 
that the divine intelligence is unable to grasp singulars like ours, so everyone 
errs who says that, if God knows something with certainty and intervenes with 
his power in  everything, that prevents contingency and freedom in  created 
18 See Expositio peryermeneias, I, lect. 14, Ed. Leon., p. 76, 305–308.
19 “Et secundum hoc aliqui posuerunt omnia quecunque in  hoc mundo aguntur, 
<etiam> que uidentur fortuita et casualia, reduci in ordinem prouidencie diuine, ex qua 
dicebant dependere fatum. | Et hoc quidem aliqui stulti negauerunt, iudicantes de intel-
lectu diuino ad modum intellectus nostri, qui singularia non cognoscit” (ibidem, pp. 76–77, 
333–340).
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things.20 I believe that the core of Aquinas’ contribution to the question about 
the relationship between divine omnipotence and created freedom lies pre-
cisely here. This is the reason why I notice one of his most successful visions of 
the problem in the commentary on De interpretatione. Aquinas focuses above 
all on God as creator. Thus, only by keeping in mind that God maintains an 
exclusive relation to created beings totally different from the one maintained 
by other entities, His intervention into created events can be explained satisfac-
torily without endangering the nature of finite beings. As Te Velde and Goris 
insisted, divine motion is a “transcendental” action and cannot be compared 
with created agency but by analogy.21 
To show the dissimilarity between God and created agents, Aquinas speaks 
first about divine intelligence, taking Boethius’ ideas that inspired his interpre-
tation of this problem throughout his career. He evokes a text of Boethius’ Con-
solation of Philosophy, where he said that God “like someone who looks above 
the things from a height”22 can see the past, the present and the future. Aquinas 
develops this image in different passages, speaking of a hill from which one 
can see people who come along a path, both distant and near, both those who 
already passed and those who are about to arrive; the situation of this viewpoint 
is very different from that of the walkers, who only see the other walkers ahead. 
Interestingly, in the commentary on De interpretatione that we are explaining 
here, instead of a simple mount the reference to an “elevated tower” appears.23 
In  the commentary to Psalm 47, also written in  this time, Aquinas says that 
“the towers are useful to see from afar.”24 In the footnotes of the Leonine edition 
of the commentary on De interpretatione, Gauthier indicates that he usually 
speaks of specula to refer to the point of view of the lookout. This scholar re-
marks that in Latin it is usual to link specula with turris. I would just like to add 
that in the Catena aurea Aquinas quotes a very pertinent text attributed to Saint 
Basil in which it is said: “[…] turris est alta speculatio ad custodiam civitatis et 
20 “Procedunt autem hee obiectiones ex eo quod cognitio diuini intellectus et operatio 
diuine uoluntatis pensatur ad modum eorum que in nobis sunt, cum tamen multo dissimi-
liter se habeant” (ibidem, 365–368).
21 See R.A. Te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas, pp. 160–183; 
H.J.M.J. Goris, Free Creatures of an Eternal God, pp. 300–304.
22 “[…] quasi ab excelso rerum cacumine cuncta prospiciat” (Consol., V, pr. 6, CCSL 
94, p. 103, 63–64).
23 “[…] in  aliqua excelsa turri constitutus” (Expositio peryermeneias, I, lect. 14, 
Ed. Leon., p. 77, 388).
24 “Turres sunt ad videndum a longe” (Super Ps. 47, n. 6, ed. Parmae, p. 334). In the 
commentary to Isaiah he had already written: “Usus turris ad conseruationem fructus, 
et prospiciendum ad custodiam” (Super Is., ch. 5, lect. 1, Ed. Leon., p. 39, 81–83).
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perceptionem hostilium occursuum apta: ad huius instar nobis datus est intel-
lectus conservativus bonorum, praemeditativus contrariorum.”25
The example of the high hill or the tower is meant to indicate that the look-
out is “out of the order of the walkers.”26 Precisely because he is out of that “or-
der”, He does not have to see the walkers “successively” but He can see all them 
“simultaneously” (simul). In a similar way, human intellect understands things 
under the aspects of past, present and future. We know the past by memory; 
thanks to our senses, we notice the present as soon as it  is in act before us. 
However, we can only guess the future by looking at its causes, but if these are 
contingent, we cannot conclude with certainty what will happen. Only if future 
events are determined in their causes by some necessity, we can predict them 
without any doubt. On the contrary, God is “outside the order of time,” situated 
in the elevation of His eternity, that is “all at once,” and every actuality through-
out the time is present to Him. God does not see the future as something that 
“is going to happen,” but by His eternity (eternaliter) He knows everything that 
happens at any time; He does so in a determined way and not by a conjecture, 
in the same way that we see the present as it is in itself but not in its cause: we 
see Peter walking here and now, we do not only conjecture it by knowing that he 
has legs to do it. Our certainty and cognitive infallibility with respect to present 
things does not eliminate anything from their contingency. Similarly, God’s sci-
ence of vision does not remove anything from the contingency of things either.
Now, things are not before God as if He were a mere observer of events. 
For this reason, it  is necessary to complete the teaching of Boethius paying 
more attention to divine will than he did. Already in  the commentary on 
De interpretatione, Boethius concluded that only if the omnipotent God is free, 
there could be freedom in creation, but he did not focus on divine will either 
there or in the Consolation. Aquinas, however, gives particular relevance to di-
25 Catena in  Lc., ch. 14, lect. 6, ed. Marietti, p. 210. Probably, this is the translation 
used by Aquinas: “Turris est alta speculatio. ad custodiam civitatis. et cognitionem super-
aggressus. hostium. apta. Talis nobis, datus est et intellectus. custos bonorum. previsivus 
insidiarum” (Ex codice CCXLVI. Fragmentum Commentarii S. Basilii in Isaiam Prophetam, 
vol. 4.2, p. 430b). For the Greek text under such translation, which is quite truthful, see 
PG 30, 270B. The authenticity of this work is suspected, but the English translator defends 
it as very probable: see N.A. Lipatov, The problem of the authorship of the Commentary on 
the Prophet Isaiah attributed to St. Basil the Great. Dobler attributes this quotation errone-
ously to Gregory of Nyssa: see E. Dobler, Fälsche Väterzitate bei Thomas von Aquin, p. 147.
26 “[…] extra totum ordinem transeuntium” (Expositio peryermeneias, I, lect. 14, Ed. 
Leon., p. 77, 387–388). When Boethius compares divine mind and creation with the spheres 
of the cosmos, he says that the center is “ceterorumque extra locatorum ueluti cardo quidam” 
(Consol., IV, pr. 5, CCSL 94, p. 81, 59–60; my emphasis).
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vine will because according to himself the knowledge of God regarding any 
creature is mediated by the divine will (S.Th., I, q. 14, a. 8). God does not know 
that things are in one way or another by being affected by them in the manner 
our eyes receive the colors which show that Peter is walking. God knows that 
things happen because He is their creator. Therefore, His creative will must be 
involved in His knowledge.
By listening to these ideas, it is easy to think about human life as seen by 
some rationalist philosophers of modernity: temporal events follow one an-
other as a manifestation of a preconceived divine project in which everything 
happens with the same necessity, a kind of movie that is already shot and is only 
shown in a movie theater. However, I think that such representations are not 
able to understand the mind of St. Thomas, although he also believes that God 
knows each event in detail and His will–either benevolence’s will, or permis-
sion’s–is always fulfilled (S.Th., I, q. 19, a. 6).
In the same way that divine intellect is outside the “order” of temporality, so 
must divine will “be understood as existing outside the order of the entities.”27 
For this reason, it is the source of every finite being and of all its differences. 
Among these differences, Aquinas points out the difference between the pos-
sible and the necessary. This means that both the necessary and the contingent 
are originated by the will of God and He himself is above both. This should call 
our attention from the beginning, because it means that even what is necessary, 
which in itself cannot not be, is under the power of divine will. It is a doctrine of 
Aristotle that Thomas repeats on several occasions: nothing prevents that some 
necessary things could have in  another the cause of their necessity.28 Those 
beings (such as the heavens and the spiritual creatures) will be in themselves 
necessary, though they are, insofar produced by divine will, contingent. Abso-
lutely speaking they are necessary, but only in that respect they are contingent 
(relatively speaking). This idea should make us realize that, like the absolutely 
speaking necessary (simpliciter necessarium) is still such even if it is under di-
vine will, yet in comparison it becomes in a way “contingent” (contingens se-
cundum quid), in a similar way the absolutely speaking contingent (simpliciter 
27 “Nam uoluntas diuina est intelligenda ut extra ordinem entium existens, uelut causa 
quedam profundens totum ens et omnes eius differencias” (Expositio peryermeneias, I, lect. 
14, Ed. Leon., p. 78, 438–441; I emphasize the quoted text).
28 See S.c.G., I, ch. 15, n. 5; S.Th., I, q. 2, a. 3; q. 50, a. 5, ad 3; Compendium Th., I, ch. 6… 
In S.Th., I, q. 44, a. 1, ad 2; I–II, q. 93, a. 4, ad 4; In Phys., VIII, lect. 21, n. 14 (Marietti §1154) 
he quotes Metaph., Δ, 1015b9–10. Aquinas’ commentary of this text: In Metaph., lect. 6, 
n. 13 (Marietti §839). 
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contingens) remains such, even if it is under the infallibility of divine will and 
it becomes only in a sense “necessary” (necessarium secundum quid).29
In the passage of the commentary on De interpretatione that we are ex-
plaining, the mature teaching of S.Th., I, q. 19, a. 8 is assumed: God’s will is the 
ultimate reason for the contingency and necessity of things. Their proximate 
causes could not suffice to make the things contingent and necessary if God 
did not want them to be that way; for that very reason He disposed such proxi-
mate causes to them. But the denomination of “contingent” or “necessary” that 
the entities receive, although depending on the causes that originate them, is 
not taken from the first cause but from the proximate cause ordered by it. The 
result is that divine will reveals itself as a singularity among all causes. There 
is no other cause capable by causing an effect of also deciding the mode of the 
effect it causes: that is, there is no cause that can decide that its effects are either 
necessary or contingent. Each one of the created causes is locked in the order 
of causality in which it has been placed by God, whether this order is that of 
contingency or that of necessity.
2.2. Nemesius in Aquinas’ commentary
Although Boethius had already timidly pointed to God’s freedom to safeguard 
the contingency of things, his considerations could have helped Aquinas to de-
velop his own understanding of divine science of vision. Of course, to elaborate 
his doctrine of divine will as an analogous cause above all the order of con-
tingency and necessity, Aquinas’ metaphysics of being was required. Without 
pretending to reduce his merit, we can appeal to another patristic source that 
could be latent under his explanation of divine will as a transcendental cause. 
I am referring to Nemesius of Emesa, known to Aquinas as Gregory of Nyssa.
We cannot understate the importance that the chapters of De natura homi-
nis on providence and free will have to understand such problems in Aquinas. 
Nemesius informs him of the teaching about the providence sustained by the 
Middle-Platonists; it is precisely against them that this author must argue in de-
fense of particular providence, which was denied by them. Like Alexander and 
29 “Necessity in the unqualified sense, necessity simpliciter, is absolute necessity. Con-
ditional necessity is necessity only in a restricted sense, secundum quid. Speaking unquali-
fiedly, what has merely conditional necessity is not necessary but contingent. This point 
considerably mitigates Thomas’s association of causality with necessity” (S. L. Brock, Cau-
sality and Necessity in Thomas Aquinas, p. 231). See D. Torrijos-Castrillejo, La providence 
chez Saint-Thomas d’Aquin comme compréhension de la totalité, pp. 303–307; idem, Tomás 
de Vío, Cayetano: Sobre la providencia y el hado, pp. 468–479.
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Averroes will later do, they accepted only a general providence. To respond to 
such doctrine, Nemesius teaches that knowledge of individuals is required for 
the perfection of providence, just as a good physician cannot neglect any detail 
of the sickness and of the patient. The comparison with the medical art used by 
Aquinas in the Summa contra gentiles also appeared in Nemesius’ treatise. This 
is Aquinas’ text:
Haec est differentia inter cognitionem speculativam et practicam, quod cognitio 
speculativa, et ea quae ad ipsam pertinent, perficiuntur in universali; ea vero quae 
pertinent ad cognitionem practicam, perficiuntur in particulari: nam finis specu-
lativae est veritas, quae primo et per se in  immaterialibus consistit et in univer-
salibus; finis vero practicae est operatio, quae est circa singularia. Unde medicus 
non curat hominem in universali, sed hunc hominem: et ad hoc est tota scientia 
medicinae ordinata. Constat autem quod providentia ad practicam cognitionem 
pertinet: cum sit ordinativa rerum in finem. Esset igitur imperfectissima Dei provi-
dentia si in universalibus consisteret, et usque ad singularia non perveniret.
Again, this is the difference between speculative and practical knowledge: specula-
tive knowledge and the functions that pertain to it reach their perfection in the 
universal, while the things that belong to practical knowledge reach their perfec-
tion in the particular. In fact, the end of speculative cognition is truth, which con-
sists primarily and essentially in immaterial and universal things; but the end of 
practical cognition is operation, which is concerned with singulars. So, the physi-
cian does not heal man as a universal, but, rather, this individual man, and the 
whole science of medicine is ordered to this result. Now, it is obvious that provi-
dence belongs to the area of practical knowledge, for its function is to order things 
to their end. Therefore, God’s providence would be most imperfect if it were to 
confine itself to universals and not extend as far as singulars.30
Nemesius argued in  a similar way, expressing a similar reference to 
a doctor:
Qualiter autem non valde inconveniens est artificem quidem cuiuscumque modi 
artis et maxime medicum procurantem universalia nil particularium neque par-
vissimum derelinquere inartificiabile vel improcurabile, scientem quod ad totum 
proficit pars, conditorem vero Deum et artificibus enuntiare indoctiorem?
30 S.c.G., III, ch. 75, Ed. Leon., p. 221b, 11–25; English trans. by V.J. Bourke in Thomas 
Aquinas, On the Truth of the Catholic Faith, vol. 3.1, p. 252. In his treatment of providence 
in the Summa contra gentiles, Aquinas quotes Nemesius’ work: see S.c.G., III, ch. 73 and 76.
Divine foreknowledge and providence in the commentaries of Boethius 165
Would it not be utterly absurd if an adept at any art, and particularly a physician, 
should take thought for the broad exercise of his art, but take no notice of details, 
or if he should leave even the slightest point outside the scope of his art and his 
concern. Such a one would know that the part contributes to the whole. And is, 
then, God the Creator to be made out to have less sense than any craftsman?31
Nemesius also explains that although it  is true, as enunciated by the 
Peripatetics,32 that human rulers do not personally take care of all things, but 
leave the most minute details in the hands of subordinates, in reality that is not 
due to their greatness but rather to their weakness. If we speak of a truly di-
vine ruler, it would not be necessary to disregard the minuscule things, because 
nothing would prevent Him from dealing with all of them. Let’s read Nemesius’ 
words:
Necesse est autem et eundem esse factorem eorum quae sunt, et provisorem; neque 
enim consequens est neque decens, alium quidem facere, alium vero ea quae facta 
sunt procurare: in imbecillitate enim videretur hoc tale esse. […] homo autem et 
aliis omnibus quae sunt secundum hanc vitam, in quantum possibile est, providet; 
quae vero non provident, propter imbecillitatem non provident.
Moreover, the Creator of existent things, and their providence, must be one and the 
same God. For it would be inconsistent and unseemly for one to create and another 
to care for what was created. For such a division clearly betrays limited powers. 
[…] man goes further and provides for his children everything else that their life 
requires, of whatever kind and in whatever quantity. There are, it is true, creatures 
that make no provision for their young, but it is to be accounted mere infirmity on 
their part that they do not.33
31 De nat. hom., ch. 42, trans. Burgundio, ed. Verbeke, p. 165, 22–27; English trans. by 
W. Telfer, Cyril of Jerusalem and Nemesius of Emesa, pp. 443–444. Aquinas seems have used 
Burgundio’s version of De nat. hom.: see W. Telfer, ibidem, p. 218. A similar reference to the 
physician is also present in Plato, Leges, X, 902d; the idea could also be linked to Aristotle’s 
observations about the importance of knowing singulars in order to heal in a right way: see 
Metaph., A, 981a12–24.
32 See D. Torrijos-Castrillejo, El aristotelismo en los primeros autores cristianos griegos, 
pp. 544–548.
33 De nat. hom., ch. 42, trad. Burgundio, ed. Verbeke, pp. 158–159, 57–64; English 
trans. by W. Telfer, Cyril of Jerusalem and Nemesius of Emesa, p. 432; my emphasis. See 
Plato, Leges, X, 901a–c.
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We see the same teaching reflected in  the afore mentioned book by St. 
Thomas:
In his quae humana providentia reguntur, invenitur quod aliquis superior provi-
sor circa quaedam magna et universalia per seipsum excogitat qualiter sint ordi-
nanda, minimorum vero ordinem ipse non excogitat, sed aliis inferioribus excog-
itandum relinquit. Et hoc quidem contingit propter eius defectum: inquantum vel 
singularium minimorum conditiones ignorat; vel non sufficit ad omnium ordinem 
excogitandum, propter laborem et temporis prolixitatem quae requireretur. Huius-
modi autem defectus longe sunt a Deo: nam ipse omnia singularia cognoscit; nec 
in intelligendo laborat, aut tempus requirit, cum intelligendo seipsum, omnia alia 
cognoscat, sicut supra ostensum est.
Besides, in the case of things regulated by human providence we find that a certain 
higher overseer thinks out the way in which some of the big and universal matters 
are to be ordered, but he does not himself think out the ordering of the smallest de-
tails; rather, he leaves these to be planned by agents on a lower level. But, as a matter 
of fact, this is so because of his own deficiency, either because he does not know the 
circumstances for the individual details, or because he is not able to think out the 
order for all, by virtue of the effort and length of time that might be needed. Now, 
deficiencies of this kind are far removed from God, because He knows all singular 
things, and He does not make an effort to understand, or require any time for it; 
since, by understanding Himself He knows all other things, as we showed above.34
Nevertheless, the passage from Nemesius most linked to our text from the 
commentary on De interpretatione is the following one:
Ipse vero extra omnem necessitatem non solum consistit, sed et dominus et factor 
est. Potestas enim existens et natura potestativa, nihil neque naturae necessitate 
neque dispositione legis facit, omnia vero sunt ei contingentia et quae necessaria.
God is not only outside any necessity but also is its ruler and author. Since He 
is a power and a powerful nature, He does nothing neither by necessity of nature 
nor by the command of a law, but all things are contingent for him, even those that 
are necessary.35
34 S.c.G., III, ch. 76, Ed. Leon., p. 225a, 20–35; English trans. by V.J. Bourke in Thomas 
Aquinas, On the Truth of the Catholic Faith, vol. 3.1, p. 255; my emphasis.
35 De nat. hom., ch. 37, trad. Burgundio, ed. Verbeke, p. 141, 49–52; English trans. and 
emphasis are mine.
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Let us now read the text of St. Thomas in his Commentary:
Nam uoluntas diuina est intelligenda ut extra ordinem entium existens, uelut causa 
quedam profundens totum ens et omnes eius differencias; sunt autem differencie 
entis possibile et necessarium, et ideo ex ipsa uoluntate diuina originatur necessitas 
et contingencia in rebus, et distinctio utriusque secundum rationem proximarum 
causarum […], effectus dicuntur uel necessarii uel contingentes, quamuis omnes 
dependeant a uoluntate diuina sicut a prima causa que transcendit ordinem neces-
sitatis et contingencie.
Divine will must be understood as if it were outside the order of the entities, as a cer-
tain cause from which all entities and all the differences of being emanate. Now, the 
differences of being are the possible and the necessary; therefore, the necessary and 
the contingent in things are originated by divine will and the distinction among 
them is made according to the nature of the proximate causes of every event […] 
the effects are called either necessary or contingent, although all of them depend 
on divine will as on their first cause, which transcends the order of necessity and 
contingency.36
This “being outside the order of the entities” of Aquinas seems very close 
to that “being outside any necessity” of Nemesius. Certainly, St. Thomas has 
in  mind an understanding of God as ipsum esse subsistens and as creator of 
every being but, in any case, here he is also referring mainly to the transcend-
ence of God regarding necessity and contingency, which is what Nemesius is 
saying in  the quoted text. Nemesius insists upon that point to indicate that 
in comparison to God’s will everything is contingent in a certain sense, because 
even the necessary depends on it. Such a combination of relative contingence 
(related to God’s will) and the intrinsic necessity of some entities becomes pre-
cisely the opposite in Aquinas: there is also a relative necessity (related to God’s 
will), i.e. a hypothetical necessity regarding the things that are in themselves 
contingent. In addition to this, Nemesius already realized that God is above 
created necessity and contingency precisely by being the author of both, and 
this is the core of Aquinas’ contribution.
Finally, in  terms of terminological similarity, the reference to the double 
“necessitation” of nature and the command of “law” made by Nemesius seems 
evoked in the mention of a lex necessitatis made by Aquinas in a parallel pas-
36 Expositio Peryermeneias, I, lect. 14, Ed. Leon., p. 78, 438–454; English trans. and 
emphasis are mine.
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sage. I refer to the following text from the commentary on Metaphysics that 
must have been written also in that same period:37
Quod quidem est singulare in hac causa, scilicet in divina providentia. Reliquae 
enim causae non constituunt legem necessitatis vel contingentiae, sed constitu-
ta a superiori causa utuntur. Unde causalitati cuiuslibet alterius causae subditur 
solum quod eius effectus sit. Quod autem sit necessario vel contingenter, dependet 
ex causa altiori, quae est causa entis inquantum est ens; a qua ordo necessitatis et 
contingentiae in rebus provenit.
This is singular in this cause, namely, in divine providence. The rest of causes do 
not institute a law of necessity or contingency but, having been established in one 
of them by a superior cause, they use it. Therefore, in the case of any other cause, 
only the fact that a thing is an effect of it depends on its causation. Now, the fact 
that this effect is necessary or contingent depends on a higher cause, which is the 
cause of being as being; the order of necessity and contingency in things comes 
from that cause.38
Likewise, in another work from this time, he writes:39
[…] voluntas Dei est principium totius entis, ergo non cadit sub ratione contingen-
tiae vel necessitatis, sed haec effluunt et ordinantur ex Dei voluntate.
The will of God is the source of every being, therefore it does not fall under the 
notion of contingency or necessity but they come from the will of God and are 
ruled by it.40
As I defended elsewhere,41 I disagree with Porro’s interpretation of these 
texts in  an article where he attributes a lex necessaria established by divine 
37 For dating, see J.-P. Torrell, Initiation à saint Thomas d’Aquin, p. 502.
38 In Metaph., VI, lect. 3, n. 32 (Marietti §1222); my translation.
39 For dating, see J.-P. Torrell, Initiation à saint Thomas d’Aquin, p. 492.
40 The text continues saying: “[…] et sic ipsa Dei voluntas facit quaedam contingentia, 
praeparando causas contingentes illis rebus quas vult esse contingentes; et similiter neces-
sarias causas rebus et effectibus necessariis. Et sic voluntas Dei semper impletur; non tamen 
omnia necessario eveniunt, sed eo modo quod Deus vult ea esse: et vult quod sint contin-
genter” (Quodlibet XII, q. 3, ad 1; I take the Latin text from Marietti’s edition, English trans. 
is mine).
41 See D. Torrijos-Castrillejo, La providence chez Saint-Thomas d’Aquin comme compré-
hension de la totalité, p. 308.
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providence for all events to Aquinas.42 When he reads this text, he understands 
that “the contingent is after all subject to this lex necessaria; therefore, it  is 
only contingent in a relative sense–regarding proximate causes–but not in an 
absolute sense because nothing is indeterminate or accidental regarding the 
providence.”43 It is surprising that he reaches this conclusion precisely by read-
ing the text from the commentary on Metaphysics quoted above. There, Aqui-
nas is not saying that all things are subject to a “necessary law” but rather that 
God is the author of both a “law of necessity” and another “law of contingency.” 
By these “laws” Aquinas refers to the contingent or necessary nature that sec-
ondary causes have, a nature that cannot be altered by themselves. God on the 
other hand is not subject to any causal law, as the text plainly states, much less 
submits everything to a “necessary law” but sometimes establishes a “law of ne-
cessity” and other times a “law of contingency.” He makes things to be exactly 
what they are. Therefore, the fact that not only the finite cause but also God 
concurs in the effect as the first cause of all things does not mean a violation of 
the contingency of any being, since God’s agency is situated above the distinc-
tion between contingent and necessary. He conserves and moves the created 
cause as a transcendental cause.
It is true that the providence of God never fails and the will of God is always 
fulfilled. But this does not mean that all things are necessary in an absolute 
sense. In fact, Porro precisely inverts the meaning of the “absolute” and the “rel-
ative” as Saint Thomas understands it. Aquinas says that contingent phenom-
ena are such in an “absolute sense” and the character of “infallible” they possess 
thanks to divine will does not make them necessary in an “absolute sense” but 
only in “a relative sense.” Divine providence ordained that such events should 
happen, and that they should happen in a contingent way. The infallibility of 
42 He quotes the expression “lex necessaria” as if it belonged to Aquinas, but, in fact, 
he coined on his own: “Thomas speaks expressly in this context of the lex necessitatis vel 
contingentiae or the ordo necessitatis vel contingentiae, and, thus, of lex necessaria at least 
in the composite sense, which is in all the effects, even the contingent ones” (idem, Thomas 
Aquinas, p. 336). In this book, Porro is more precise than in the precedent article of 2012 
and so he also says that “this does not imply the necessity of every effect” (ibidem, p. 337).
43 “Anche ciò che è contingente, in definitiva, è sottoposto a questa lex necessaria: per-
tanto esso è contingente solo in  senso relativo  – rispetto cioè alle cause prossime  – ma 
non in senso assoluto, perché nulla è indeterminato o accidentale rispetto alla provvidenza” 
(P. Porro, “Lex necessitatis vel contingentiae”. Necessità, contingenza e provvidenza nell’uni-
verso di Tommaso d’Aquino, p. 434).
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divine action does not endanger the contingency but safeguards it: things are 
contingent precisely “because of the efficacy of divine will.”44 
To corroborate my interpretation of simpliciter and secundum quid neces-
sity, let’s see how that distinction is expressed by Aquinas himself in this text 
taken from the commentary on De interpretatione:
[U]nde non potest simpliciter <et> absolute dici quod “omne quod est, necesse est 
esse”, et omne “quod non est, necesse est non ese”, quia “non idem” significat quod 
omne ens, “quando est” sit ex necessitate, “et” quod omne ens “simpliciter” sit “ex 
necessitate”: nam primum significat necessitatem ex suppositione, secundum autem 
necessitatem absolutam.
One cannot simply and absolutely say that everything that is necessarily is and eve-
rything that is not necessarily is not, because it does not mean the same thing that 
“every being, when it is, is by necessity” and that “every being absolutely is by neces-
sity,” since the first means hypothetical necessity, while the second means absolute 
necessity.45
Certainly, Porro knows well that the necessity that Aquinas admits for con-
tingent things is a necessity “in the composite sense”46 and that such necessity 
is therefore opposed to necessity “in the divided sense.” Despite this fact, as we 
had seen in the article he published in the same year as his book (the Italian 
version of the book was also printed in 2012), he called “absolute” the necessity 
imposed by the lex necessaria coined by him to describe the infallible plan of 
divine will. In any case, I think that even in the book the conditional necessity 
seems be understood as if it were an absolute one: at the end of the day, for 
Aquinas even contingent things are necessary. If they are called “contingent,” 
it is a sort of compromise.
44 “[…] distinctio contingentium a necessariis […] contingit propter efficaciam divi-
nae voluntatis” (S.Th., I, q. 19, a. 8, Ed. Leon., p. 244; I emphasize the text translated in the 
body). “Sicut enim dicit Dionysius, IV cap. De div. nom., §33, col. 734, t. I [PG 3, 733B], 
non est providentiae naturas rei destruere, sed salvare” (Super Sent., I, d. 39, q. 2, a. 2, co., 
ed. Mandonnet, p. 932). See De rationibus fidei, ch. 7 and also S.Th., I, 48, a. 2, ad 3, where 
he quotes the same text of De div. nom. Aquinas’ translation of the words of Ps. Dionysius 
seems a reference to Jn 12,47. Remember the well-known motto “gratia non tollit naturam 
sed perficit eam” (see S.Th., I, q. 1, a. 8, ad 2; consider also: “gloria perficit naturam, et non 
destruit”; Super Sent., IV, d. 49, q. 2, a. 3, ad 8, ed. Parmae, p. 1204).
45 Expositio Peryermeneias, I, lect. 15, Ed. Leon., p. 81, 36–42; English trans. and em-
phasis are mine.
46 P. Porro, Thomas Aquinas, p. 336.
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The point of Aquinas is precisely the opposite: the “(hypothetical) neces-
sity” of contingent things in God’s will and providence is extrinsic to them and 
it does not make them truly necessary. In fact, Aquinas is saying that divine 
causation is not perfectly understandable for us, since it is “outside the order 
of the entities.” Such transcendental agency cannot put either contingence or 
freedom in danger, because it is the one guaranteeing them. Such an action is 
outside our experience. It teaches us that if we control the effects of the instru-
ments we use until the last detail, then the instruments do not act with internal 
spontaneity (e.g. a person guiding a donkey with a leash); if we give orders by 
leaving some freedom to them, then we are not able to determine the exact use 
of the instruments’ agency (e.g. if I order someone to go to the square with-
out saying which street he should take, then I will not be able to determine 
the exact outcome of the process which I am producing). However, God acts 
in another way: He is able to determine all the details of the effects which are 
still spontaneously produced by secondary contingent or free causes. In a word, 
Aquinas puts us in front of a mystery.
Conclusions
We have seen how Boethius helps Aquinas to understand the mystery of di-
vine knowledge, which foreknows even future contingents. This combination 
between the necessity possessed by divine knowledge, insofar as infallibly de-
termined, and the contingency belonging to certain things allows Aquinas to 
understand how a certain necessity in the sphere of the divine is compatible 
with contingency in  the sphere of the creatures. Boethius, inspired by Neo-
platonism, a philosophy that also permeates other important sources used by 
Aquinas in this field, like St. Augustine, gives St. Thomas the possibility of el-
evating the divine nature above every created being. Thus, God is established 
above all creatural order and, in this way, when our theologian moves from the 
problem of knowledge to the problem of will, he will be ready to understand 
that also divine will must be situated beyond every finite cause. It may have 
been Emesius of Emesa who helped Aquinas to elaborate this idea, although 
his own metaphysics of being undoubtedly oriented him to establish not only 
a very accurate concept of divine being but also of divine action.
David Torrijos-Castrillejo172
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